We test a real options model with competitive interactions using an extensive commercial real estate data base. The competitive nature of the local real estate market as proxied by the market's Herfindahl ratio is found to have a significant effect on building starts: larger values of the Herfindahl ratio, consistent with less competition, are associated with fewer building starts. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in this ratio leads to a 25.9% decrease in the number of new building starts. Other variables suggested by the real options model, such as the volatility of local lease rates, are also found to be important. * We thank the CoStar group for graciously providing the data and Alessio Saretto for excellent research assistance.
Introduction
There have been numerous applications of real option pricing models to investment decision making in commercial real estate. Examples include, among others, Titman (1985) , Williams (1991) , and Quigg (1993) . By simply treating the exercise price as exogenously given, traditional real option pricing models, however, do not take into account the fact that the exercise of the option ("investment") by one developer may very well affect the building price faced by other developers and their resultant exercise strategy. More recently, researchers have begun to investigate the impact of the exercise of the option by one developer on the investment decisions of others. In particular, Grenadier (2001 Grenadier ( , 2002 ) has developed a model to value real estate leases which takes into account these competitive interactions.
This paper relies on an extensive commercial real estate data set to empirically investigate a version of a real option pricing model with competitive interactions. We begin by describing the essentials of that model. Unfortunately, as we shall see, many of the assumptions needed to develop this model simply do not hold in practice. Therefore, rather than test the model per se, we empirically investigate the implications of the model. That is, we rely on the model to identify the economic variables, including the degree of competition, that should affect a developer's decision to invest in commercial real estate. We then test whether these variables do indeed influence this decision in the direction posited by the model. The paper closest to ours is Bulan, Mayer and Sommerville (2002) . They examine condominium developments in Vancouver, Canada between 1979 and 1998 and find that increases in risk, both systematic and unsystematic, delay real estate investment.
They also find that an increase in competition, as measured by the number of nearby projects, attenuates this relation. As opposed to our study, they look at only one market over a longer period of time, while we consider many different markets and exploit the cross-sectional differences between these markets. Moreover, we look at commercial real estate development in general and use a different measure of 1 For further details, the reader can refer to Grenadier (2001 Grenadier ( , 2002 . competition, the Herfindahl ratio characterizing the competition in a particular real estate market.
The Model and Comparative Statics
In this model, a local real estate market is assumed to be oligopolistic and is made up of n identical developers who develop and lease identical buildings. To fix matters, at time t, developer i owns q i (t) units of completed and rentable space. This space is assumed to be infinitely divisible and the analysis is couched in a continuous time framework. At any point in time, developers can develop new rentable units at a constant cost of K per unit of space.
The value of owning a building arises from its underlying service flow. The instantaneous lease rate, P (t), is the price of the flow of these services. It is assumed that the lease rate evolves in such a way as to clear this market at each point in time.
Following Dixit and Pindyck (1987), the market inverse demand function is assumed to be given by:
and Q(t) = n j=1 q j (t) is the industry supply process. Here X(t) represents a multiplicative demand shock. Examples of demand shocks include job growth, changes in industrial production, or changes in disposable income. In this model X(t) is assumed to evolve as a geometric Brownian motion:
where α is the instantaneous conditional expected percentage change in X(t) and σ is the instantaneous conditional standard deviation. The risk-free interest rate r is assumed to be constant with r > α to ensure convergence. The cash flows are valued in a risk-neutral framework. That is, the process for X(t) is assumed to be risk-adjusted.
2 Necessary to ensure a well-defined equilibrium. See Grenadier (2001).
Under the above assumptions, Grenadier (2001, 2002) derives the symmetric Nash equilibrium development strategies. In particular, he obtains the equilibrium value of each identical firm in closed-form:
where
The first term in equation (3) represents the present value of the growing perpetuity of cash flows generated by the real estate assets in place. The second term, by contrast,
gives the value of the option to develop additional leasing space.
The equilibrium strategy for each developer is to develop an incremental unit whenever the state variable X(t) rises to the trigger level X * (Q(t)). This solution implies that the equilibrium lease rate also follows a geometric Brownian motion but with an upper reflecting barrier at v n :
In other words, so long as X is sufficiently high, there will be no new investment and lease rates will evolve according to expression (4) . Otherwise, the lease rate will be fixed and developers will invest.
This simple model provides insights into the economic variables that affect the decision to develop additional property. The implications of the model with respect to the trigger level X * are as follows:
Sensitivity to the Number of Competitors
The trigger level is a decreasing and convex function in n, the number of developers:
As a result, increasing competition leads developers to develop sooner as the fear of preemption diminishes the value of their "option to wait".
Sensitivity to Volatility
The trigger level is an increasing function of the volatility of the demand shock X(t):
As in all option models without competitive interactions, an increase in volatility delays the point at which an American option is exercised. In this case, however, this effect is attenuated by the presence of competitors.
Sensitivity to Expected Growth
The trigger level is a decreasing function of α, the expected rate of growth in the level of demand:
In other words, when demand is growing faster, all else being equal, the developer invests sooner.
Sensitivity to the Rate of Interest
The trigger level is an increasing function of the prevailing rate of interest
3
, that is,
3 In this and the previous two cases, the results hold for all reasonable values of the parameters.
When interest rates go up the value of the option and the exercise trigger also increase.
Of course, it should be pointed out that the model only assumes constant interest rates as well as a flat term structure of interest rates.
Sensitivity to Existing Supply
The trigger function is also increasing in Q:
Obviously, keeping everything else constant, the larger the existing supply of real estate, the higher will be the trigger level.
Caveats
Before we turn to the data and our empirical results, it is important to emphasize that while this model is rich in its many implications, it is a highly simplified description of reality. For example, the model assumes that at each point in time the supply of office space is equal to its demand, with the lease rate equilibrating the two. This would imply that there are no vacancies, yet in the real world we do observe vacancies.
These vacancies reflect the time required to search for new office space and the large transaction costs involved in moving from one location to the other. In addition, lease rates in the real world are somewhat sticky and do not adjust quickly enough to clear the market.
This continuous time model also assumes that construction is instantaneous and that
it can be accomplished in infinitesimal amounts. In reality there are construction lags and real estate investment is lumpy. This implies that the fit of the model to real world data will not be perfect and also suggests that lagged values of the explanatory variables might have an effect on current construction.
Finally, the equilibrium solution of the model is a symmetric Nash equilibrium. This assumes that the n developers are identical in all respects and that they build identical buildings. In reality, however, developers vary in size, efficiency, preferences, etc. are heterogeneous, because they incur opportunity costs as well as variable costs to altering capacity, and face aggregate uncertainty regarding demand for their output the price of which is determined endogenously and is a function of the firms' investment decisions. In such a setup even with a large number of competitive firms, option premia are significant and firms optimally defer irreversible investment, choosing not to undertake some positive NPV projects. The implication for commercial real estate investment is that even though a large number of firms may compete vigorously, underlying heterogeneity prevents them from all competing directly over any given investment opportunity.
As can be seen by this discussion, there is no agreement as to the importance of competition on the option to develop's trigger point. By including a variable that proxies for the degree of competition in a local real estate market, we hope to shed light on this issue.
Data
Our data source is the CoStar Office report which is derived from a database of existing and under construction office buildings in each metropolitan area covered by the CoStar group. We consider the following thirty-four metropolitan areas: Atlanta, 
Description of Variables
The model developed above has implications for the valuation of office buildings as well as for the optimal exercise of the option to develop additional office space. In our empirical tests we concentrate on the latter. In particular, we investigate the effect of the posited explanatory variables on the trigger point at which development occurs. Table 1 .
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the model is the number of class A buildings that are started during a particular quarter. This information is not directly available from our data set. However, it can be inferred from data available on the number of buildings delivered and the number of buildings under construction. In particular, the number of starts is defined as the change in the number of buildings under construction plus the number of buildings delivered. An obvious deficiency of this measure is that it treats all buildings as having the same size.
From Table 1 we see that for our sample the average number of class A building starts per quarter is 4.54 with a median of 2 starts. Since the number of building starts can only take on non-negative values, the minimum number of starts observed is zero while the maximum is 37 starts recorded for San Francisco during the first quarter of 2000. Figure 1 provides a histogram of the dependent variable. Notice the numerous instances when we observe either zero or a very few starts per quarter, while many starts during a given quarter are very infrequently observed. In fact Table   2 provides a cumulative tabulation of new building starts from which we see that over fifty percent of our sample involves no more than two starts per quarter.
Independent Variables
The explanatory variables are selected to correspond to variables of the model. We also include other explanatory variables which attempt to address some of model's limitations.
Volatility of the lease rate:
For each distinct city, we have time series data on the corresponding quoted lease rates. The volatility of the percent change in these lease rates from one quarter to the next is calculated and used as a proxy for the volatility of the demand shock process in that particular city. This is consistent with the model save for the fact that the lease rate in the model is subject to a reflecting barrier corresponding to the case when development occurs. This feature may introduce a downward bias to our volatility estimate. However, in reality there is not a fixed boundary at which development occurs, so this bias should be minimal. As this is an option based model, increases in volatility delay investment and so we predict that the coefficient on this variable in a regression of new building starts will be negative.
For our sampled cities, the mean annualized volatility is 7% with a median of 6%. The minimum annualized volatility observed is 2% for the Raleigh market, while the San Francisco market has the highest annualized volatility of 18%. The distribution of these volatility estimates across the sample cities is provided in Figure 2 .
Growth of the lease rate:
The growth rate of the percent change in the observed lease rates is calculated and used as a proxy for the growth in the demand shock process. However, given our brief sample period, these estimates are most likely imprecise measures.
The average annualized growth rate, from Table 1 , is seen to be 5% but varies from a low of -1% in New York City to a high of 11% in Orlando.
Lagged unemployment growth:
We have a time series of total unemployment for each city. We take the annualized growth rate in this variable as an alternative proxy for the drift in the demand shock process. The model assumes that developers can instantaneously invest, whereas in reality the decision to invest takes times so that there is a lag between employment growth and buildings starts.
The coefficient on lagged unemployment growth in a regression of new building starts is expected to be negative, consistent with higher unemployment leading to less investment.
The average annualized unemployment rate is 5%, being the lowest in Austin The larger this ratio, the less competitive is that real estate market. We use this variable to proxy for the level of competition in that city, which in the model is represented by the number of competitors. More competition leads to more investment and so we expect the coefficient on the Herfindahl ratio in a regression of new building starts to be negative. 
Total Number of Buildings:
For each city, we have data on the total supply of class A buildings. Since the cities differ in their sizes, we control for these size differences which do not appear in the model. Naturally, larger markets should have more construction and so the coefficient on this variable in a regression of new building starts should be positive.
By this measure, Los Angeles is the largest market while Jacksonville is the smallest.
Empirical Method and Results

Poisson Regression
A count variable only takes on nonnegative integer values. In our case, the number of buildings started in a given quarter is a count variable. Like other count variables, there is no natural a priori upper bound on the number of these buildings started and, at the other extreme, the outcome could very well be zero.
If y denotes our count variable and x is the vector of our explanatory variables, we are interested in estimating the population regression, E(y|x). The most straightforward approach is a linear model, E(y|x) = βx and estimating the parameter vector β using ordinary least squares (OLS). Unfortunately, ifβ is the OLS estimator, there can be values of x such thatβx < 0, so that the predicted number of new buildings started will be negative, clearly inappropriate for count data.
Alternatively, we will use a Poisson regression model to analyze our count data. That is, y given our covariates x ≡ (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ) is assumed to have a Poisson distribution whose density is
Assuming µ(x) = exp(xβ), which ensure positivity for any value of x and any parameter value, as well as a random sample {(x i , y i ) : i = 1, . . . , n}, the log likelihood for observation i is
The parameters of this model are easy to interpret. Since
That is, 100β j is the semi-elasticity of E(y|x) with respect to x j . That is, for small changes in x j , ∆x j , the percentage change in E(y|x) is approximately 100β j × ∆x j . Table 3 presents our estimation results. Consistent with all real option pricing models, the coefficient on volatility is negative and highly significant. Note that, by comparison, in traditional discounted cash flow methods volatility does not affect the decision to invest. The semi-elasticity of new building starts with respect to volatility is -10.9% meaning that a one standard deviation increase in volatility leads to a 10.9%
Empirical Results
decrease in the number of new building starts, all else being equal.
Consistent with the spirit of Grenadier's model, the Herfindahl ratio is negative and highly significant. It would appear that the heterogeneity and opportunity costs effects suggested by Novy-Marx are not strong enough in our data to offset the effect that the degree of competition has on buildings starts put forward by Grenadier.
The semi-elasticity of the new building starts with respect to the Herfindahl ratio is -25.9% meaning that a one standard deviation increase in this ratio leads to a 25.9% decrease in the number of new building starts, all else being equal. Not only is this effect statistically significant, but it appears to be economically significant as well.
Also consistent with Grenadier's model, the growth rate in the lease rate positively affects the number of building starts with a one standard deviation increase in the growth rate resulting in a 14.4% increase in the number of building starts. As expected, the size of the market proxied by the total number of buildings in the local market is also highly significant, both economically and statistically.
The lagged unemployment rate is also highly significant both statistically and economically with more unemployment leading to fewer building starts. Surprisingly, the lagged vacancy rate, a variable outside of the model, is not significant. We would expect that higher vacancy rates would lead to fewer building starts. Our result may reflect the fact that other variables, such as the lease growth rate and the lagged unemployment rate, are picking up this effect.
Interestingly, the one variable whose effect is contrary to the predictions of the model is the interest rate. We find that increases in the 10-Year constant maturity rate actually lead to a significant increase in the number of building starts. This result could reflect the fact that during our sample period the interest rate level was proxying for the level of economic activity and building starts are positively related to this level.
In addition, the model assumes a very simplistic term structure model which may not be accurately capturing the role of interest rates in our data.
Conclusion
Real options models have been put forward to better understand the investment decision making of firms. Recently, researchers have began to investigate the role of competition in these models. Using a extensive data set on commercial real estate, we provide an empirical investigation into the importance of competition in actual investment decision making. In particular, we find that the number of building starts is influenced by the competitive nature of the local real estate market. This effect is both statistically as well as economically significant. In addition, other variables identified by the real options pricing model as being important in investment decision making, such as volatility, are indeed found to be important as well.
Our results suggest that incorporating game theoretical concepts into real options models has the potential of helping to better explain real world investment decisions.
Empirical tests such as ours are important in identifying the deficiencies of current real options models and suggesting avenues for new research. 
